Australia can see more of its M&A market; deal discipline must catch up

A larger market than the traditional record could show

A July 2026 Reserve Bank of Australia research paper provides the first large-scale administrative database of Australian mergers and acquisitions across the past 20 years. The researchers combined three signals: clusters of employees moving between firms, firms moving between tax-consolidated groups, and takeover or other notification forms lodged with the corporate regulator. Their combined methods identify around 1,500 mergers a year [1]. That figure is an estimate built from linked administrative data, not a complete official census of every transaction.

The study matters because Australia previously had no comprehensive merger dataset, partly because parties were not generally required to notify the competition regulator. It also finds patterns that conventional announced-deal databases can miss: mid-sized, profitable but lower-productivity firms were more likely to be targets; firms with many patents were also more likely to be acquired; and serial acquisitions appeared in several high-profile industries [1]. These are historical associations, not a forecast that a firm with those characteristics will be acquired.

The regulatory system now creates a new transaction record

Australia’s merger-control system changed materially on 1 January 2026. Acquisitions meeting the prescribed thresholds must now be notified to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, and the parties must receive approval or a notification waiver before proceeding [2][3]. The system is mandatory and suspensory: regulatory clearance is part of execution, not a post-completion housekeeping item.

The headline thresholds make transaction planning more specific. One test captures acquisitions where the parties have at least A$200 million of combined Australian revenue and the target has at least A$50 million of Australian revenue or the global transaction value is at least A$250 million. A separate test applies where an acquirer group has at least A$500 million of Australian revenue and the target has at least A$10 million. Cumulative thresholds also look back over three years for acquisitions involving the same or substitutable goods or services, subject to exclusions [2]. The ACCC cautions that its summary is general guidance, so the legislation, exemptions and transaction facts remain decisive.

Early operating data show speed, but not yet the full cycle

In the regime’s first three months, the ACCC received 50 merger notifications and 108 waiver applications. It approved 39 notifications in phase 1, while two progressed to phase 2. Phase 1 approvals took an average of 18 business days; waiver decisions averaged 11 business days, with 70 granted and six not granted. Across the voluntary transition and first quarter, the ACCC reported that 91% of acquisitions were decided within 20 business days [4].

Those early results support the view that straightforward matters can move within a defined timetable. They do not establish a permanent clearance rate or timetable for more complex transactions. The sample covers only the opening months of a new system, and the statutory phase 2 period can extend to 90 business days in specified circumstances [4]. Deal models therefore need both a base regulatory timetable and a downside case for deeper review, information requests or transaction-specific extensions.

The 1,500-versus-50 comparison is not evidence of under-reporting

The strongest alternative interpretation deserves explicit treatment. An estimated 1,500 mergers a year in the research database and 50 notifications in the first quarter of the new regime measure different populations and periods. The historical research includes transactions inferred from administrative changes, while notification applies only when current thresholds and connection requirements are met and no exemption applies [1][2]. Many smaller acquisitions, internal restructures and ordinary-course asset transactions may fall outside the notification system.

It would therefore be incorrect to infer from the numerical gap alone that parties are failing to notify. The more defensible inference is that no single data source describes the whole market. The mandatory register should improve visibility over larger and potentially competition-sensitive transactions, while administrative research can illuminate broader acquisition patterns. Over time, comparing the two may improve understanding of concentration and serial acquisition, but that work will require several years of consistent data.

What changes for buyers, sellers and advisers

The commercial response is to move merger-control screening earlier in the deal process. Buyers need a reliable view of Australian revenue across the group, the target’s Australian connection, transaction value, relevant asset and voting-power tests, and acquisitions made during the preceding three years. Sellers need to understand whether the likely buyer’s scale or acquisition history could change the regulatory path. Both sides should align conditions precedent, long-stop dates, information rights and risk allocation with the realistic review route rather than treating clearance as a standard clause added late.

Our inference from the new evidence is that acquisition history is becoming a first-order diligence item, particularly for serial buyers. The historical research shows that repeated acquisitions are economically material, and the current thresholds can aggregate certain acquisitions involving the same or substitutable goods or services [1][2]. What remains uncertain is how notification volumes, waiver use and phase 2 activity will evolve after the first year. For now, the durable lesson is procedural: establish the competition perimeter and regulatory timeline before price, financing and integration assumptions harden.

• Map Australian revenue, control, asset and transaction-value tests at the start of diligence.
• Build a verified three-year acquisition history for the buyer group and relevant product or service markets.
• Model both an early clearance path and a deeper-review path in timing, financing and conditions precedent.
• Treat the ACCC register and emerging administrative data as complementary evidence, not interchangeable market totals.